Introduction
The main problems facing Romanian agriculture may be categorised as follows: (i) debt problems;
(ii) operational problems; and (iii) restructuring problems in an "enabling" environment dominated by government intervention [Davis and Hare, 1997] .
Debt problems concern the existence of debts with state integrators, local banks and moneylenders. Inter-enterprise arrears accumulated prior to the transition process are a less important problem for small private farms. Higher than expected inflation (160% for 1997) and interest rates, which are significantly negative in real terms, have further exacerbated the problem.
This has made it difficult for farmers to service loan repayments out of earnings. 59% of our survey respondents did not apply for a formal loan because of high interest rates; 5% did not have sufficient collateral.
Operational problems mainly relate to financial issues concerning inadequate cash flow and profits to cover operating and investment expenses. These problems may derive from a variety of sources e.g.: input price hikes higher than anticipated interest rates; a lack of financial management tools (e.g. appropriate deposit instruments to manage the flow of internal savings of the farm); and inexperienced farm management to manage cash flow fluctuations (often a function of the seasonality of production). In our survey, for Romanian farmers the return on capital is often lower than the interest rate charged [Davis and Gaburici, 1998 ].
Farm restructuring problems mainly concern the "enabling environment" [Davis and Hare, 1997] .
In most CEECs, agricultural investment has fallen, but we do not believe that this is the result of increased interest rates, but mainly due to broader farm restructuring problems and macroeconomic instability [Davis and Gaburici, 1998 ]. Several explanations may be proposed for the above problems e.g. the slow pace of land reform, privatisation, rural financial market deepening and agri-food industry restructuring. Several explanations may be proposed for the slow pace of change and the low level of financial intermediation in Romania's rural areas. As discussed previously by Davis and Hare (1997) , in general term's Romanian rural finance problems are similar to those experienced by most transition economies:
• Banks regard collateral in farming as compared to the rest of the economy, as inadequate. This is partly due to slower progress made in reforming property rights and land titling than other parts of the economy. The lack of an effective rural land market in Romania, is a significant constraint in this regard. Romanian banks assign more importance to the lending risks and losses, than the potential loss of customers;
• Anecdotal evidence suggests that the policy framework for the sector generally (but cereals in particular), is perceived by the financial sector as being particularly risky as changes in tariffs, quotas, price controls, restrictions on internal trade or the behaviour of government intervention agencies may affect output and profitability. In Romania, this attitude is changing and there is a growing interest in providing rural finance to rural dwellers. However, government intervention in the sector is far higher (and possibly more damaging) than most other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs);
• As a result of the two aforementioned problems, there is a general consensus (although a declining one), that providing finance for the sector is a government responsibility, through dedicated and discounted lending facilities;
• Commercial banks are generally wary of involvement with discounted lending schemes as they have to assume some of the risk. Thus, farmers and agri-processors are mainly confined to dealing with State banks, e.g. Banca Agricola (BA;
• In common with most transition economies, the Romanian banking system was used to dealing with large enterprises and farms. It has been slow to adapt its institutional base or develop systems for small scale lending, which has inhibited the development of small-scale processors, traders and private farmers; and
• Given the relative lack of skills and experience of newly emerging market agents, it is probably unreasonable to expect new farmers to possess the financial skills to deal with bankers.
An important aspect of the process of creating a viable rural financial market in Romania will require the development of a legal framework for land ownership (property rights), land and lease markets. This will enable land use to reflect commercial decisions supported by land as collateral for loans. Given the above, our analysis of the rural financial market in Romania has two distinct aspects:
• A quantitative evaluation of some measurable variables, for example factors affecting the amount of loans and the volume of savings; and
• A qualitative aspect, concentrating on the relationship between financial service suppliers and their beneficiaries and the motivations of participation or non-participation of the farmers in the development of the rural financial market.
The structure of the paper is as follows: (i) understanding the determinants of formal loan demand, (ii) an analysis of formal credit demand, (iii) loan amounts, (iv) sources of credit and reasons for that choice, (v) loan security, (vi) credit utilization, (vii) private farms savings, and (viii) the use of credit as an instrument for rural development of areas. Moreover, we have estimated two (logisitic) regression models: a) to determine the main characteristics of the private farms that have access to formal credit; and b) to estimate how farm income, the source and utilization of credit each impact on the actual loan amounts obtained. For a full description of the Romania: Rural Financial Market Development for the Small Private Farm Sector survey see Appendix 1.
The Determinants of Formal Loan Demand
The Romanian private farms are generally under capitalised. There is a great need for investment capital and for inputs purchasing although relatively few farmers ask for formal credit (loans) [Heidhues, et. al, 1998 ]. The term formal here means those financial resources available through official or legal institutional channels (e.g. banks or State ministerial agencies). Later we will consider some aspects of informal finance, which refers to informal savings and credit groups (e.g. CARE and Roata). The results of the first survey shows that during the period 1996 -March 1997, only 42 farms asked for formal loans, which represents 19.1% of the total survey. During the second survey (April -December 1997) 34 loan applications (15.5% of the total sample) were registered.
During the first survey approximately 3 farms per month requested a formal loan. During the following period, of the second survey, 4 farms per month requested a formal loan. In both surveys, the highest demand for loans was recorded for Brasov County. The regional distribution of credit demand is presented in Tables 1 and 2 . Applications for formal credit declined sharply in Brasov County (by 50%) but increased in Dolj and Timis Counties. In terms of the actual distribution of credit demand by total area (Total area = own area + area leased -area leased out.) in both surveys on average, farms within an area range of ≥ 1 ha but ≤ 8 ha of land appear to make the most loan applications (see Davis and Gaburici, 1998) . However, in both surveys, the same percentage of the sample applied for a formal loan and the low level of demand continued (19%).
One of the major objectives of both farm surveys involved the identification of the main reasons that have determined the low level of demand for loans. In the first survey questionnaire we included 4 pre-established reasons, but also instructed the enumerators to note any other reasons given by the farmers. A comparative analysis of the data shows a significant change for each reason as a share of the total number of responses between the first and second surveys (see Tables 5 and 6 ). At the first survey (April 1997), the dominant reason given was No. 1, "could not fulfil the loan conditions", whereas at the second survey (in December 1997), the main reason was No. 6, that the "interest rate is too expensive". This change may be explained by the fact that during 1997
there was a relaxation of the credit conditions imposed on private sector borrowers and a greater diversity of credit sources became available. At the same time, the Government has considerably reduced the subsidization of interest rates for farm loans, but has introduced some assistance through voucher subsidisation 1 . However, in Romania the most disturbing aspect is the fact that the interest rate is still fluctuating wildly. 1997 ended with an inflation rate of 152%, the private farmer's fear of high interest rates is probably justified. Certainly, it is mainly large former state or co-operative farms which benefit greatly from government subsidised interest rates and subsidy programmes [Davis and Hare, 1997] .
To better understand how private farmers perceive the interest rate, in the second survey questionnaire, we introduced the following question: What is the maximum annual interest rate acceptable to you? Around 50% of the farmers in the sample answered this question. Also the number of those who requested a loan is smaller than the number of those who expressed an opinion about the level of loan interest rates. The results for the 110 farmers are presented in Table 7 . An interest rate of 60 -75%, which was considered acceptable by 20.9% of the farmers, is in fact similar to the bank lending rates of e.g. the Credit Union in 1997. This interest rate would also have been convenient for commercial banks for 1998, if the inflation rate had not exceeded the levels forecast for the 1998 budget (42%). However, the majority of farmers (68.2%) have indicated (unsurprisingly) that an interest rate of 5 -20% per annum, some of the respondents emphasising "subsidised interest rates", would be more acceptable (see Table 7 ). The farmers' desiderata concerning interest rates is quite unrealistic concerning interest rates and the term of future loans given that in 1996 farmers' were paying a subsidised interest rate of 39% in 1996 [Davis & Hare, 1997] . Table 8 shows that a majority of farmers who in April 1997 stated that they did not apply for loans because they could not meet the bank requirements to obtain credit, which encouraged us to enlarge the questionnaire to more closely consider this question. The results of the "subreasons" for failing to apply for a loan shows that the main credit condition that could not be met was that of farm insolvency (insufficient incomes). Also, loan contracts typically contain the following clause: the Credit Union reserves the right to revise the loan interest rate resulting from a change in the rate of inflation or refinance interest rate. In the case of interest rate rises resulting from revision, the Co-operative de Credit (Credit Union) has the obligation to inform the debtor. The Credit Union (Popular Bank) asks the debtor for their own assets as guarantees and from part of the guarantors also. The assets guarantee contract is annexed to the loan contract.
In the case of the Agricultural Bank (Banca Agricola) and other commercial banks, the loan contract stipulates a fluctuating interest rate that is established by the Agricultural Bank, as a function of the costs of its credit sources. If the borrower delays bank debt repayments, they will pay an increased interest rate. Between the date of loan approval and in effect its use, the borrower is obliged to pay the bank an annual commission for the non-utilisation of a loan. The bank determines this in percentage terms. A further condition imposed by the Agricultural Bank requires the presentation of a land "ownership title". This document certifies the farmers full property rights for land, however due to the slow progress with the administration and implementation of land titling procedures, the receipt of these titles are usually subject to great delay. Our second survey found that 7% of those farms, which could not meet the loan requirements, blamed this on the lack of an "ownership title". In the second survey, farmers were asked to estimate the capital requirements for their farm (see Table 9 ). Few farmers in our survey report that they have borrowed money (at least through formal channels) in 1997, how 54.6% of the sample have provided an estimate of capital requirements for 1997. The average capital requirement for the sample is 15,546 DM per farm, whilst the average private farm sales revenue for 1997 was 4,535 DM [Davis and Gaburici, 1998 ]. The capital requirements (or required level of borrowing) for 1997 is thus estimated by farmers at roughly 3 times the current level of sales, which appears to be highly exaggerated.
These estimates may be attributed to inexperience, which leads to the inability of farmers to correctly forecast their financial needs.
Access Constraints and Satisfying Formal Credit Demand
We now turn to an assessment of the private farmers' access to formal loans. Of those who did apply for formal credit in our second survey (15%), 79% of those respondents received a formal loan. Farmers in Brasov and Dolj fared considerably better than Timis farmers in this regard, but this result is not conclusive because of a big difference in the number of respondents.
Furthermore, when we considered the distribution or access to formal credit according to age, we found that of those who applied for credit between the age of 40 -60 years, 19.5% of them received the credit as compared to a sample average of 16%, and for under 40s of 8.3%. This probably reflects the relatively older rural population and that the average age of these farmers' is 54 years [Davis & Gaburici, 1998 ]. Table 10 summarises data from both our surveys to clarify the kind of access private farmers have to both formal and informal credit. The whole sample is utilised for the purposes of comparison between 1996 and 1997. If we compare the 1996 sample to 1997, it is clear that on average 84% of the 1996 sample were denied credit, but this proportion fell by 5% in 1997 to 79% of the sample. This is still a relatively high proportion of the sample with rejected applications, or restricted access to credit. Nonetheless whilst the decline in reductions occurred in Brasov and Dolj Counties, they increased 6% in Timis County. Regarding access to credit in total, there has been a substantial increase in access in Brasov and particularly Dolj (up 16%) Counties, whilst in Timis access to credit fell by around 50%. 94% of the Timis sample had no access to any credit in 1997, and increase of 10% since 1996. The majority (76%) of credit access in Timis comes through informal channels; only 1.6% of the Timis sample obtained a formal loan. In Dolj access to formal credit is of prime importance as 19.5% of the Dolj sample obtained credit this way, as compared to 9.1% of the Dolj sample through informal channels in 1997. Brasov is unusual, in that although 25% of the 1997 sample obtained credit, all of it came through formal channels. Access to credit is intertwined with two other factors, namely the mechanism of credit allocation and the level of family farm (or household) participation in the financial market (see Schrieder & Heidhues, 1997) . Moreover, it is a function of the family farms' demand for, and the supply of financial services, not simply access to these services. However, a major methodological problem concerns the estimation of demand and the extent to which supply constraints reduce potential demand. Figure 1 is a decision tree showing the demand side participation of private farmers in Romania's financial markets to illustrate this problem. The decision tree also reflects access to formal loans based on the results of the first survey. The farms are categorised into borrowers and non-borrowers. The latter is differentiated into loan supply constrained (denoted NO in Figure 1 ) and non-constrained (denoted Yes in Figure 1 ). The model of participation in the financial market is a two-stage or sequential decision process. Thus in Figure 1 we begin by asking the question whether the respondent applied for a formal loan of the whole sample (220 farms). At the second stage we make two further qualifications based on the response to our initial question: on the one hand if the response is NO we ask why the respondent did not apply for a loan; and on the other if the response was YES we ask whether they received a loan and the entire amount applied for.
Let us first consider the potential demand and access constraints identified by those respondents who did not apply for a formal loan. Figure 1 shows that of those who did not apply for a loan (81% of the sample, N=178) 24% (N=44) did not do so as a result of restricted access to credit.
On the contrary, 44 respondents either did not need a formal loan or already had one. As noted previously, the main reasons for not applying for a loan were that the respondents could not fulfil the loan conditions (N=70), the interest rate is too expensive (N=26) and the procedure is too complicated (N=22). Only points 1, 2, 6 and 9 in Figure 1 , met the criteria to be categorised as resulting from restricted access to credit. We have argued that the other reasons given (points 5, 7 and 8) would benefit from a government awareness campaign N=11 (5%), as they do not result from restricted access. On the contrary, these are based upon a negative perception of financial institutions (N=3), a lack of confidence in credit institutions (N=2) and a rejection (largely for cultural reasons) of credit (N=6). Other restrictive conditions totalled N=5. Now we consider the potential demand and accessibility of those respondents who did apply for a formal loan. Figure 1 shows that of those who did apply for a formal loan (19% of the sample, N=42), N=6 did not obtain a loan (due to restricted access) and N=36 did; 35 of whom received the entire amount applied for. Perhaps the N=7 of those who applied for loans and either obtained a reduced amount or nothing, reflect bank rationing. Given the large sums of capital required to fund much of the needed investments the farmers identified (see Table 9 ), it is a little surprising that only a few farmers actually applied for a formal loan. The results of the decision tree in Figure 1 show that rural financial access constraints although important, are much less significant than the 81% of the sample that did not apply for a loan would suggest. Indeed, we have argued that only 59% of the sample (N=130) could be categorised as having encountered restricted access to credit (5% of which is the result of rationing). We found that 36% of the sample did not encounter restricted access to credit. This is a higher than anticipated number given the results of earlier preliminary studies [Schrieder and Heidhues, 1997] . The model estimated takes the following form 2 (1):
where p is the estimated probability for a farm to obtain credit, B i are the parameters, x i are explanatory variables and e is the error. The model may be summarised as follows: Table 11 shows the estimated parameters, standard error, Wald test and level of significance for each variable. The parameter estimates of B are both statistically significant and the positive or negative sign of B indicates whether an increase of a variable by one unit may result in an increase in the probability of obtaining credit. Therefore an increase in off-farm income (excluding the sale of farm products) (SRC_SMBS), may increase the probability of a private farmer obtaining credit as the coefficients are positive. The result confirms our initial findings on the economic activity of private farms in Romania [Davis and Gaburici, 1998 ]. increase in the area of pastures and moisture by one hectare enhance the probability of obtaining credit by 11%. The existence of off-farm sources of income from e.g. a small business (excluding the sale of agricultural products) increases the chances of obtaining credit 2.7 times. Thus, ceteris paribus an increase of a variable by one unit may result in an increase in the probability of obtaining credit by a proportional factor of Exp(B). This result is both logical in terms of the economic activity of private farms in providing collateral and meeting the security requirements many banks require for interest repayments. Moreover, it is consistent with the survey findings discussed in Davis and Gaburici (1998) .
The following Figure 2 provides a visual assessment of the goodness-of-fit. On the horizontal axis the predicted probability is shown. For each 5% cluster a bar is displayed indicating how many cases fall within that probability range. For example: 52 cases are predicted to obtain credit with a probability of between 10% and 15%. Furthermore each bar is split into two parts reflecting the number of cases that had actually obtained credit (the upper portion) and how many did not. there is no theoretical basis for determining how many farms should obtain credit, we will consider the empirical results. In this model the actual percentage of cases in which farms took credit is 13.6%. For the sake of simplicity we shall consider cut-off points of 10%, 15%, and 20%. For each cut-off point model accuracy is estimated in Table 12 below. The best choice appears to be a cut-off point of 15%, which balances the probability of correctly predicting either category of cases. The correct prediction ratio is 75%.
Loans and the Distribution of Credit
We now consider the amounts and distribution of credit that these farms have access to from both informal and formal sources. We have estimated the average amount of loan held per farm at 901 DM (US$ 501) rising to a sample maximum of 15,000 DM (US$ 8,348). Table 13 shows that informal credit portfolios average 665 DM (US$ 370) whilst informal credit portfolios are typically larger at 1,000 DM (US$ 556) per farm. The average is influenced by two large loans from the Agricultural Bank in Timis and Brasov Counties (see Figure 3) . The median loan portfolio of the individual private farmers' shows that although the loans from the formal sector are larger, that rely primarily on the informal sector (see Figure 3) . To look more closely at the distribution of private farm credit from informal and formal sources in Table 14 we present a cluster analysis of the combined surveys. The credit cluster (Kurtosis) is a measure of the extent to which observations cluster around a central point, given their standard deviation. Most informal credit is ≤ 500 DM (the cluster centre is 318 DM), for formal credit between 500 -2000 DM, (the cluster centre is 989 DM), and the cluster centre for the whole sample is 4,350 DM. Credit distribution peaks in April to finance input expenditures which rise in May but peak in September -October for harvesting costs and the sowing of winter wheat. Sales peak late in the year, thus other sources of income and finance are required by private farmers for most of the year (see Figure 4 on the monthly distribution of credit). 
How To Get It and From Whom? Credit
At the time of the first survey (April 1997), in Romania there were 135 rural subsidiaries and 146 agencies located in rural areas and small towns where agriculture is the main activity (e.g. Segarcea town included in our sample). The total number of subsidiaries and agencies is 921.
Compared to the density of financial institutions nationally (1.2 institutions per 10,000 persons), in the rural areas the density is 1.3 institutions per 10,000 persons in agriculture. During the period 1993 to 1996, agriculture annually received both subsidies (in the form of quasi-fiscal transfers) and subsidised credits [Davis & Hare, 1997] . The volume of these interventions accounted for between 11 to 21% of the agricultural sector GDP and 2 -4% of the country's GDP. Only 2% of the credit portfolio was given to the private farming sector. The Agricultural Bank remains the dominant institutional player in terms of supplying rural finance to the agricultural sector. The Agricultural Bank supplied approximately 90% of the total volume of credit in the agricultural sector, through its 44 units in the rural areas. The Agricultural Bank both distributed the State's mandated lending programmes to the sector, and directed the majority of this to the State farms and farm associations with a juridical status. We found that the Agricultural Bank has granted fewer loans, but of a greater value compared to the Credit Union (Co-operative de Credit). Table 15 shows that the Agricultural Bank has provided 10 loans, 26.3% of the all loans made (38 loans were received by farms in our sub-sample. However, Table 16 shows that Agricultural
Bank accounts for 48% of the total the value of loans received by the farms and 57% of all loans over 2,000 DM (see Table 15 ). The Credit Union (Co-operative de Credit) continues to play an important role in providing affordable credit and rural finance. Although the Credit union provided the greatest number of loans, the value of these loans is only 28% of sample total. Table 16 shows that the Credit Union provides 70.4% of all credit ≤ 500 DM per loan and over 50% of the credit valued between 500 -2,000 DM (see Table 16 ). Another source of finance was BankCoop, which accounted for 11.4% of the total volume credit. Finally, the RBD (Romanian Bank for Development) provided a loan of 7,036 DM and the Mutual Aid Fund a loan of 375 DM.
By the end of 1997, the credit investments of the A.B.S.C. were 1,931.2 billion Lei. Of this investment volume approximately 71% were short-term loans in "lei" (national currency) and almost 25% of the credit was in foreign currency. Tables 17 and 18 show the results of the number of formal credit by source and the total amount in DM for the combined surveys. They confirm the tendencies observed in the results from the first survey, and Figure 5 clearly illustrates this. Why do the private Romanian farmers in our survey choose these particular financial institutions?
In order to address this question we asked and codified 6 main reasons which are listed in Table   19 . The main explanation offered for farmers choosing informal rather than formal finance is that they perceive it to be the only source of funds available to them (37%) and mutual aid and friendship (37%). Interestingly, 40% of Banca Comerciala's customers chose them for the same reason. Co-operative de Credit and the Agricultural Bank both score highly on cheap credit (low interest rate charges) and confidence from their customers. Indeed, 36% of the sample chose their bank because they had confidence in the institution, 23% because of cheap credit, 16% because it was the only loan available, and 9% because it was the only source of credit that they were aware of. 6% of the sample chose their financial institution because of its fast application through to loan delivery procedures. Thus, cheap credit and confidence in the financial institution If we compare total rural financial investment in 1997 with 1996, we find that 39.5% of the 1997 sample have sourced funds from predominantly rural financial institutions. In 1996 the proportion was much higher at around 65.8%of the sample. 35% of the financial institutions selected by rural dwellers have significant industrial activities (comparatively to 17% in 1996); 25.55 are clients from trade, services and other sectors (compared to 17.2% in 1996). All these changes indicate that the Romanian banking system is maturing and that banking strategies of identifying and penetrating new markets, for the dispersion of risk is beginning to benefit the agricultural sector. 
Loan Security
We will now address the question of how do private Romanian farmers in our survey secure loans? Farmers often argue that one of the main factors, which hinder their access to formal credit, is a lack of collateral. Table 20 shows that in the first survey, over 66% of the loans obtained from the Agricultural Bank and BankCoop were guaranteed by mortgaging a house, or other assets (stables, warehouses and silos). At the Credit Union, 77% of the applicants had a joint guarantor. If we consider the combined surveys and both informal and formal credit separately, Table 21 shows that there are distinctly different forms of collateral required. The main types of security required from informal sources are cattle (17%) and the standing harvest (12%). However, the vast majority of informal credit (58%) is provided without any security requirements. Most farmers still turn to formal sources of credit, but the situation regarding security is completely different. All formal financial institutions require some form of collateral, the most common being the provision of a joint guarantor (44%) (typically, collateral is also required from the guarantor), or a mortgage on their house (36%). There are also some interesting differences between the formal financial institutions. For example, Banca Comerciala only provides loans secured by a mortgage on the applicants' house (100% of their customers in our survey respondents). Similarly, BankCoop (71%) and the Agricultural Bank (Banca Agricola, 63%) tend to provide loans to the private farm sector secured by a mortgage on property. The only exception is the Credit Union (Co-operativa de Credit) where 78% of the loans they provided to private farmers were secured by a guarantor. This places fewer constraints (e.g. the lack of a land title, thus land cannot always be used as collateral) on access to credit, which is also why it remains the most popular bank in rural Romania. If we consider loan security by credit amount for the combined surveys, in Table 22 , our cluster analysis shows that the use of a guarantor in securing loans (44% of the sample) is of central importance for private farmers. Thus, for loans ≤ 500 DM, a guarantor secures the vast majority (71%). A guarantor also secures 42% and a mortgage 37% of the loans within the range of 500 to 2,000 DM. However, for loans ≥ 2,000 DM a mortgage on a house provided collateral for 57% and a guarantor 21% of this sub-sample (see Table 22 ). Some of the loans provided by a few of the banks to private farmers or small to medium sized enterprises (SME) in agriculture may be secured by the Guarantee Fund of Rural Credit. At present, the shareholders of this fund are the following commercial banks: the Agricultural Bank, the Romanian Commercial Bank, the Romanian Bank for Development, and BankCoop. The
Guarantee Fund of the Rural Credit seeks to attract other commercial banks to widen the scope of their activities.
In 1997, guarantees were provided for medium and long-term credit for investment purposes. In 1998, the fund will probably begin to guarantee short-term loans for input procurement and agricultural production. In February 1998, the Guarantee Fund of Rural Credit began to offer security for loans guaranteed by farmers at the shareholding banks of this fund. The fund also guarantees the letter of bank security which farmers need to comply with. The fund recently launched a share issue, so that other financial institutions could become shareholder within it.
Credit Utilisation
Most of the private farmer credit is utilised to purchase seasonal agricultural inputs. Almost 31% of all informal credit are used to purchase seasonal inputs (e.g. seeds, fertiliser etc). Table 23 shows that the purchase of agricultural equipment (17%), social expenses (14%), house construction (11%), other loan repayments (11%) and the consumption of consumer goods (11%) are also important. The use of formal credit is quite different. The majority of formal credit is used to assist house construction (24%), the procurement of seasonal agricultural inputs (19%) and equipment (13%). Formal credit tends to be directed to large capital expenditure projects e.g.
house construction, whilst informal credit tends to be used to fund social expenses (e.g.
weddings) and to procure inputs. Indeed, agricultural input and equipment procurement accounts for 56% of the utilised credit. Table 24 shows the use of credit by credit clusters. For small loans ≤ 500 DM, most is spent on agricultural inputs (24%), social expenses (21%) and house construction (18%). For medium sized loans within the range of 500 to 2,000 DM most is spent on house construction (24%) and seasonal agricultural inputs (22%). However, for big loans ≥ 2,000 DM 33% was spent on agricultural equipment (cattle included) and 19% on seasonal agricultural inputs (see Table 24 ).
Again, agricultural input and equipment procurement accounts for the majority (52%) of the value of all utilised credit. 
Factors Affecting the Amount of the Loan: A Regression Model
This model attempts to demonstrate how the source of credit, level of farm income and the main utilisation of credit affect the loan amount. The main use of credit was determined by applying percentages for the level of utilisation as indicated by the farmers in our survey. Only the credit obtained for purchasing farm equipment was found to be significantly different from other credit usage (see Tables 23 and 24 ). The average amount of credit for the main sources of credit with regard to credit utilisation is shown in Figure 6 (the averages are geometric because the distribution is log-normal). Where y is the dependent variable, B i are the parameters, x i are explanatory variables and e is the error. Codifications for the factor levels utilised in this model are presented in Table 25 . A statistical summary of the model is presented in Table 26 . This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. a.
The parameter estimates reflect the relationship between the source of a loan and the natural logarithm of the disbursed loan amount. Table 27 shows that the relationship is particularly significant for the most popular banks among private farmers, namely Banca Commerciala, Banca Agricola and BankCoop. Most of Banca Commerciala's customers chose them as a source of finance because they perceived it to be the only source of finance available to them (see Table   19 ). This supports many of our earlier propositions regarding the relationship between the source of loan and amount (see section 5). The model results suggest that a reasonable level of farm income is important in obtaining a loan with the main banks, but less important for individual or informal sources of finance.
We then sought to test whether the differences in the slopes (from one source of credit to another) are relevant. Subsequently we tested the null hypothesis that slopes for all sources of credit are equal. We computed K=LB, where B is the parameter vector and L is the linear combination of parameters (a contrast matrix). If the hypothesis is correct then K=0. We then sought to test whether K is significantly different from 0 and found that it is. Thus, our hypothesis that all slopes are equal was rejected because the vector is not orthogonal and is therefore self cancelling. We will now consider the impact of macroeconomic instability (particularly high levels of inflation) on private farmer savings behaviour.
Private Farm Savings

The Impact of Inflation on Savings
Romania's macroeconomic performance in 1997 was far worse than anticipated a -6.6% decline over the same period of 1996 [EC, 1998] . A sharp fall in output (82% of 1989 aggregate output level) had been caused by the overall restrictive monetary, fiscal and income policies. Domestic demand has fallen sharply and price liberalisation (particularly the continuous and automatic adjustment of administratively controlled prices) and the partial indexation of wages led to a 22% decline in purchasing power (see Appendix 1, Table A1 ). The consumer price index (CPI) for 1997 was 154.8% over the same period of 1996 [EC, 1998] . Construction activity fell sharply (22%) and fixed capital formation fell 16%. Agricultural output was particularly good, with high grain harvests. For the first half of the year monetary policy was fairly tight with the NBRs cessation of providing mandated subsidised loans to the agricultural sector and SOEs.
Unfortunately during the summer monetary policy was relaxed, leading to an increase in inflation (see Figure 7) . The policy was further tightened in October, which led to a new increase in nominal and real interest rates. Unfortunately, the NBR has failed to create a stable and predictable monetary framework. If the current monetary policies are continued, there could be further significant reductions in output and lower investment. The financial viability of many firms and banks would also be seriously affected; therefore it is important that confidence be restored as soon as possible to retain the support of the population for the new governments reform programme.
For those with "lei" deposits in the banking system, 1997 began unfavourably, as inflation, and significantly negative real interest rates (see Figure 7) gradually eroded their savings. Although in April 1997, the inflation rate began to decline sharply, bank interest rates did not begin to do so until summer. The banks maximised their interest rate gains during the period. During the same period, bank interest rates were far higher than the rate of inflation; the difference peaked in July when the monthly rate of inflation was 8.1%, and the banks' average interest rate was 61%.
Since November 1997 (and at the time of writing), the bank interest rate has continued growing.
First, there was a sudden increase in interest rates on the monetary interbank market. This was followed by a growth in passive interest (interest granted by banks for the amounts attracted from the population). These increased slowly due to the inertia and caution of the commercial banks, which did not welcome the growth in rates. This is because although passive interest rates were increasing, the number of loans being made (the majority of which was on a short-term basis) declined steadily. At the time of writing, credit as a source of investment is hardly used, because of the high inflation. The public sector banks are also showing signs of structural weakness; not only have the authorities approved costly restructuring plans for two major banks (e.g. Agricultural Bank), but the current economic difficulties and high interest rates have further worsened their balance sheets.
Since January 1998, the bank interest rates have continued rising the tone being set the National Bank of Romania, which increased its austerity programme. By attracting significant amounts of capital from the interbank market (over 6,000 billion Lei), the NBR has begun to reduce the level of inflation. Furthermore, an important boom in the interest rates offered by the commercial banks was registered, together with the first issue of State bonds for the population in January. The
State granted these bonds with a maturity term of 3 months at an interest rate of 75% per annum, some 15 -20% over that offered by the commercial banks. As a consequence, the banks were obliged to increase their offers, at the time of writing short term (1 to 3 months) interest rates averaged 60 -65% per annum. J a n -9 7 F e b -9 7 M a r -9 7 A p r -9 7 M a y -9 7 J u n -9 7 J u l -9 7 A u g -9 7 S e p -9 7 O c t -9 7 N o v -9 7 D e c -9 7
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Monthly Inflation Rate Monthly Interest Rate savings has also declined greatly, as the data presented in the following tables will show. Although Dolj County is one of the most economically deprived regions of Romania (and has a much lower farm product sales incomes than Brasov or Dolj), in our survey it had both a) the greatest number of savings deposit holders and b) the highest (in terms of value) savings balance at the dates recorded in the questionnaire. An explanation may be found in the prudence of the farmers of this region, because they are frequently affected by drought and very little crop insurance exists in Romania, they have a higher predisposition to saving. Similarly, we tried to explain the lack of savings in the other two counties, where the income from farm product sales is greater. Some farmers from Brasov maintained that this was because they were immediately reinvesting their income.
Most private farmers conduct deposit and withdrawal transactions in their own village, particularly with the most popular banks, the Agricultural Bank (52%), Savings bank (CEC) (45%) and Co-operativa de Credit (67%). The main banks in which the farmers deposit their savings are the Agricultural Bank, which attracted 44% of deposits and the Savings Bank (CEC) with 24%. Although most farmers borrow from Co-operativa de Credit, only 3% of the sample actually save with them (see Table 31 ). The main reason for this will be explained below. It should be noted that farmers are depositing their savings in more than one bank, which is why the number of deposits is greater than the number of persons who deposit. Given the economic conditions and doubts about the financial viability of some banks, it would appear that farmers are also spreading their deposit risk. Another reason for avoiding the deposit of savings is the general uncertainty and lack of confidence in the banking system, created by the failure of some banks and aspects of the "Caritas" type. Certainly, our second survey shows that the main reasons that people choose a bank for their deposits is confidence in its financial stability (37%) and a good interest rate (31%) (see Table 32 ). New regulations regarding a savings guarantee should reduce future risks for those depositors. The deposits of Co-operativa de Credit (Credit Union), which operate according to Law 109/1996 regarding the regulation of the credit co-operative system, are excluded from the deposit protection offered under the Guarantee Fund. These banks could have a larger customer base in rural areas, if their customer deposits were also guaranteed. This is why although most farmers borrow from Co-operativa de Credit, only 3% of the sample actually save with them We think that a future inclusion of them in either: (i) a deposit guarantee system regulated by the NBR or (ii) a private guarantee fund, would increase the farmers confidence in these institutions which could contribute to the further enlargement and diversification of the rural financial market.
Credit as an Instrument for the Economic Development of Rural Areas
We began this paper by highlighting the main problems that have been identified by our survey and previous studies regarding rural finance [Heidhues, et.al, 1998; Davis and Hare, 1997] . Following Heidhues et.al., (1998) at a more general level, the building of an efficient and effective rural financial market requires a multifaceted approach. An essential base requirement is financial discipline and monetary stability. In Romania, as in other CEE countries, this cannot be achieved if the Central Bank under the command of the Government is pushed into financing loss-making state enterprises. Independence from Government interference of the Central Bank with its key mandate being securing monetary stability is a precondition for effective financial market development. Schrieder and Heidhues (1997) have argued that even if institutional density is well developed, as is the case in Romania, financial innovations are needed at four levels to improve private farmers' and other rural people's access to the financial market:
• at the financial system level in creating a reliable, fair and enforceable regulatory framework with an effective supervisory structure;
• at the organisational level either in restructuring banking institutions to better serve the rural client market or to strengthen existing rural finance institutions, such as the credit cooperatives in Romania, or institute new ones if a reform of existing structures turns out to be not feasible;
• within finance institutions, streamlining application, approval and supervision processes and integrating participatory client involvement, and
• offering new services geared to the needs of the rural clientele.
These are institutional innovations that require a major long-term effort in education, training and gathering experience, in changing laws and restructuring institutions and in redefining responsibilities.
At the farm level we have identified some important factors underlying the main determinants of loan demand. The most important of which are discussed below.
Private farmers often express their need for credit to undertake capital investments, yet low cash rates of return and high uncertainty regarding the ability to service a loan lead to a low level of effective demand for borrowed funds. We argue that this aspect of rural finance is crucial but often overlooked. It is also important as it could both encourage the development of financially viable (profitable) private farms and the entry of market-oriented finance institutions in rural areas. Romanian private farms are generally undercapitalised and in great need of capital, particularly for the purchase of farm inputs. However, relatively few of our respondents actually apply for formal credit (18%). The main reasons for this were that farmers felt that they could not fulfil the loan conditions or that the interest rates were too high.
The majority of farmers, who in April 1997 stated that they did not apply for loans because they could not meet the bank requirements to obtain credit, did so because the main credit condition that could not be met was that of farm insolvency (see Davis and Hare, 1998) . The slow pace of both upstream and downstream agri-food industry privatisation exacerbates the farm debt related rural finance problems. For example, State silos tend to charge farmers rent for grain storage rather than the Western practice of buying grain. Given the degree of under-investment in the Romanian private farming sector, it seems particularly heinous to deprive them of working capital. This further inhibits farmers access to farm inputs (fertiliser, fuel etc) and enhances their dependence on subsidised credit programmes to finance these investments (see Davis and Gaburici, 1998) ;
The results of our decision tree in Figure 1 show that rural financial access constraints although important, are much less significant than the 81% of the sample that did not apply for a loan would suggest. Indeed, we found that only 59% of the sample (N=130) could be categorised as having encountered restricted access to credit (5% of which is the result of rationing). We found that 36% of the sample did not encounter restricted access to credit.
The results of our credit logistic regression model to determine the main characteristics of the private farms that have access to formal credit suggest ceteris paribus that an increase in the area of pastures and moisture by one hectare enhance the probability of obtaining credit by 11%. The existence of off-farm sources of income from e.g. a small business (excluding the sale of agricultural products) may increase the chances of obtaining credit 2.7 times. This further reinforces the survey findings which suggest that increased asset values and a secure off-farm income providing good quality collateral and a secure non-farm income make such farmers both attractive to banks and less of a risk. Similarly, t he loan regression model parameter results suggest that a reasonable level of farm income is important in obtaining a loan with the main banks, but less important for individual or informal sources of finance.
Farmers often argue that one of the main factors, which hinder their access to formal credit, is a lack of collateral. Most farmers still turn to formal sources of credit, but the situation regarding security is completely different. All formal financial institutions require some form of collateral, the most common being the provision of a joint guarantor (44%) (typically, collateral is also required from the guarantor), or a mortgage on their house (36%). The role of a guarantor in enabling access to rural credit has previously largely gone unnoticed, however, they play an important role in obtaining a loan. The main types of security required from informal sources of credit are cattle (17%) and the standing harvest (12%). However, the vast majority of informal credit (58%) is provided without any security requirements. Private farmer bank deposit saving rates are quite low (37% of our sample), indeed most farmers spread their deposits between more than one bank. The main reason for this is the general uncertainty and lack of confidence the population have in the Romanian banking system and economy.
The financially constrained Romanian private farmer faces many obstacles, particularly: the fluctuating interest rates which are very high, the national currency which is unstable (the impact of convertible currency markets), a relaxed fiscal policy, and an evolving legal system. The income from the interest earned on credit could be eroded because of inflationary growth and high resource costs. Other elements include bank lending short-termism, which does not support investment over long periods. Long term credit (on 5, 7 or even 15 year terms) is rare in Romania due to the unstable macroeconomic environment. The generally unstable economic and political situation and the implications this has upon the legal system, all lead to reluctance among farmers to seek credit.
Although the pace of economic reform quickened during the beginning of 1997 the momentum stalled as the economic and political situation deteriorated 5 . This has delayed reform and weakened foreign investor confidence in the sector. Much still needs to be done to ensure that restructuring and privatisation of large SOEs (e.g. the Regies Autonome) is accelerated to prevent further macroeconomic destabilisation. So long as the current policy of high interest rates is promoted by the NBR, bank credit cannot become a strong instrument for economic development. So far as rural economic development is concerned, this cannot take place without 5
Internal dissent within the ruling coalition government resulted in a government reshuffle and the departure of Social Democratic ministers in January 1998. size, number of children and family income. Dolj is a flat dry area in the southwest of Romania with many family associations with a legal classification (i.e. usually co-operatives that have emerged from former state farms). Brasov is mountainous and located at the heart of Romania with primarily small private individual farmers. Timis is fertile ( banat) region comprised of private farmers' associations and individual farmers 7 . We randomly selected a sample of private farms from each commune.
The first survey covers:
Rural financial market during 1996 -March 1997;
Resources and economic activity of farms in 1996;
Some aspects of economic activity of farms in 1995.
The second survey covers:
Rural financial market during April -December 1997;
Resources and economic activity of farms in 1997. Budget balance % GDP -4.1 -2.6 -3.9 -4.5
Trade balance $ bn.
-0.4 -1.6 -2.5 -1.5
Current account $ bn.
-0.4 -1.8 -2.6 -1.6
Gross foreign debt $ bn. 
